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Abstract.   
Biological diversity is known to play an important role in generating and maintaining 
ecosystem productivity and other functions, and has consequently become a central focus 
of many efforts to preserve ecosystem services.  Theoretical parallels suggest the 
diversity of fishing fleets may have a similarly important role in determining the 
productivity and ecological impacts of fisheries, but this possibility has rarely been 
explored.  Here I present theoretical analyses showing that the diversity of métiers – 
combinations of technology, target species, and fishing grounds – and technical 
efficiencies in a fishing fleet have important impacts on the productivity, profitability, 
and ecological impacts of fisheries, particularly mixed-stock or multispecies fisheries.  
Diversification of métiers can increase yields and reduce threats to weak stocks in both 
managed and unmanaged multispecies fisheries.  Diversification of technical efficiencies 
creates opportunities for larger profits in managed fisheries, but often decreases yields 
and worsens impacts on weak stocks in unmanaged fisheries.  These results suggest that 
the potential impact of management may be highest in fisheries with diverse fleets. 
Keywords: gear; technical interactions; spatial management; catch balancing 
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Introduction 
Biological diversity is widely considered to be an important driver of the 
productivity and stability of ecosystems and the services they provide (see McCann 2000; 
Loreau et al. 2001; Palumbi et al. 2009; Cardinale et al. 2012 for recent reviews).  In 
ecological communities of consumers, diversity leads to high productivity through 
complementarity effects, whereby species with different resource requirements are able 
to partition resources more efficiently (Tilman et al. 1997; Lehman and Tilman 2000; 
Loreau and Hector 2001; Thébault and Loreau 2003); and sampling effects, whereby 
more diverse communities are more likely to contain highly productive species by chance 
(Tilman et al. 1997; Loreau and Hector 2001).  Both of these effects cause consumer 
diversity to impact resource availabilities (Tilman et al. 1997).  Diversity increases the 
stability of ecosystems’ productivities and services through ‘portfolio effects’, whereby 
functional redundancies between species allow sudden perturbations affecting one 
species to be compensated by other similar species; and ‘negative covariance effects’, 
whereby sudden collapses in the abundance of a species lead to compensatory increases 
in the abundances of its competitors (Lehman and Tilman 2000; McCann 2000).   
The role of biological diversity in promoting high and stable yields in fisheries 
has been well studied, with similar conclusions: Diverse aquatic ecosystems are generally 
thought to lead to more productive and stable fisheries (e.g. Worm et al. 2006; Palumbi et 
al. 2009; Schindler et al. 2010).  The diversity of fishing fleets is also likely to play an 
important role in determining the productivity, stability, and ecological impacts of 
fisheries, but this has not been widely or systematically explored.  Though there are 
strong theoretical parallels between fishers and ecological consumers, there are also some 
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important differences.  Fishers’ behaviours and incentives can be complex and plastic, 
and can be influenced by management (Branch et al. 2006). Fisheries management can 
also have varying goals including profits, employment, food production, subsistence, 
recreation, and cultural value (Branch et al. 2006; Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 
2009; Chan et al. 2012).  Fishers can vary widely in their technical efficiencies, and thus 
may not be bound to the same types of tradeoff surfaces as many other organisms are 
hypothesized to be – where it has been suggested that differences among species in 
overall resource-use efficiency are minor compared to differences in resource 
specialization (Tilman 2011).  
Fleets can be diverse in a variety of ways.  Fishers within a particular fishery may 
differ from one another in terms of their choice of fishing grounds, vessel sizes and gear-
types, and target species; as well as their objectives, expert knowledge, behavioural 
plasticity, risk aversion, and other differences (Branch et al. 2005; 2006).  Recent 
evidence from some fisheries suggests that certain types of fleet diversity can create 
important opportunities for progress toward management objectives in certain situations.  
For example, in mixed-stock or multispecies fisheries, in which any particular gear-type 
is likely to catch multiple species or stocks (populations), management often faces the 
challenge of navigating tradeoffs between overexploiting slow-growing populations, 
often termed ‘weak stocks’, and under-exploiting more rapidly reproducing populations 
(Hilborn 1976; Boyce 1996; Hilborn et al. 2004).  Recent studies on multispecies trawl 
and groundfish fisheries in the E.U. (Marchal et al. 2011; Ulrich et al. 2011), United 
States (Dougherty et al. 2013), Canada and New Zealand (Sanchirico et al. 2006), and 
tuna fisheries in the Pacific (Sibert et al. 2012) have each found that management can 
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overcome some of these tradeoffs at large spatial scales through management schemes 
that govern the allocation of fishing rights among fishers having different fishing grounds, 
gears or target species.  In fisheries with diversity in economic efficiency, management 
using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can increase fishery profits by encouraging 
the trading of fishing rights from low-efficiency fishers to high-efficiency fishers 
(Grafton et al. 2000; Marchal et al. 2011; Grainger and Costello 2012; Schnier and 
Felthoven 2013).  
Here, I use a combination of general theoretical models and stochastic simulations 
to illustrate some important opportunities and pitfalls presented by fleet diversity to the 
yields, profits, and ecological objectives of fisheries.  Following recent bioeconomic 
literature, I consider fleet diversity in terms of two concepts: 1) ‘métiers’ (ICES 2003; 
Marchal et al. 2013) or ‘fishing opportunities’ (Branch et al. 2005) – unique 
combinations of fishing gear, target species and geographic and temporal targeting that 
have roughly uniform relative catch-rates of different stocks in a multispecies or multi-
stock fishery; and 2) technical efficiency (Hilborn 1985; Marchal et al. 2013) – which 
determines the costs at which fishers obtain particular catches at particular abundances.  
I focus on two broad classes of fisheries: 1) those in which collective action 
towards fishery-wide goals is possible; and 2) fisheries in which there is neither 
management nor access restrictions, and fishery-wide outcomes are thus shaped 
predominantly by uncooperative competition among fishers (Clark 1976). For brevity, I 
hereafter refer to the former type of fishery as ‘managed’ and the latter type of fishery as 
‘unmanaged’, but note that not all unmanaged fisheries are open-access and 
uncooperative, nor is management necessarily a requisite of fishery-wide cooperation.  In 
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managed fisheries, I focus on the effects of fleet diversity on the range of achievable 
outcomes relative to common fishery-wide goals (yield- and profit-maximization, and 
weak stock protection), rather than comparing specific types of management (e.g. quotas, 
reserves, maritime zoning, etc.). In unmanaged fisheries, I focus on effects of fleet 
diversity on fishery-wide outcomes (yield, ecological impacts) via competition among 
fishers.    
I provide theoretical evidence suggesting that: i) diversifying métiers in 
multispecies fisheries should often lead to higher yields and less overfishing of weak 
stocks in both managed and unmanaged fisheries – by creating opportunities for 
management to reduce tradeoffs between objectives for different stocks, and promoting 
balanced exploitation in unmanaged fisheries; and ii) diversifying technical efficiencies 
should create greater opportunities for management to increase fishery-wide profits, but 
lead to more severe depletions (and thus lower yields) in unmanaged fisheries.  For 
brevity, my analysis focuses on equilibrium statics, and thus effects of fleet diversity on 
the temporal stability of yields, profits, stocks, and ecosystems, as well as other possible 
dynamic effects are not considered explicitly, but are discussed and deserve future study.   
 
Mathematical framework and operational definition of fleet diversity 
The analyses presented here use a ‘fishing unit’, defined as a group of fishers 
from a particular métier having a particular efficiency, as the base unit of fleet diversity. 
Métiers are defined in this analysis by their relative catch-rates of different stocks.  
Efficiency is defined by the cost of obtaining catch, controlling for relative catch rates 
and stock abundances. Thus, a particular fishing unit’s métier is defined by relative 
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catchabilities (per-capita-per-unit-effort catch rates) for different stocks, while its 
efficiency is determined in combination by the magnitudes of stocks’ catchabilities and 
the per-unit-effort costs of fishing. 
 Defining fishing effort in terms of unit costs (i.e. measuring effort in dollars 
instead of hooks, days, etc.) allows for a simple mathematical representation of métiers 
and efficiency as components of catchability.  Suppose S different fish stocks are caught 
in a fishery, and each stock has population size, Ni(t) for stock i at time t, and a per-capita 
growth rate, 
€ 
gi N t( )( )  for stock i, in the absence of fishing, where 
N t( ) = N1 t( ),N2 t( ),...,NS t( )( )  (i.e. stocks may interact ecologically with one another).  
Suppose fishers in a particular fishing unit, j, are spending Ej(t) (in dollars or some other 
monetary unit) on fishing effort and catch a fraction, qij, of individuals of stock i with 
each dollar spent (qij is the catchability of stock i in fishing unit j).  Because relative 
catch-rates are the key distinguishing features of fishing units for the purposes of this 
analysis, it is instructive to consider qij constant for all stocks (i) and fishing units (j), and 
to consider changes in qij for any particular fisher – resulting from catch hyperstability 
(Harley et al. 2001), economies of scale (e.g. Squires and Kirkley 1991), or changing 
behaviour, for example – as transitions between fishing units.  Thus, stock i, if only 
targeted by fishing unit, j, has a rate of change, dNi(t)/dt at time t, given by: 
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( ) − qijE j t( )( )   (1a). 
The price-per-individual caught of stock i is denoted pi, and I allow it to be a 
function of abundance (Ni) (i.e. pi = pi(Ni(t))). I assume throughout this analysis that pi is 
either constant or increasing as the harvest rate of stock i falls (i.e. piʹ′(.) ≤ 0) because 
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harvest rate falls as population size (N) falls, and decreased harvest rate implies decreased 
supply, which typically leads to either constant or increasing prices depending on the 
availability of substitutes and elasticity of demand (Clark 1976, 1985). However, I also 
assume that price does not increase fast enough to result in rising per-unit-effort revenues 
with decreasing abundance (i.e. d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi > 0 for all Ni, i is assumed). Violation of 
this assumption would likely result in the extinction of stock i because profit margins 
would increase as abundance declined (see Appendix A; and Courchamp et al. 2006).  
Lastly, I assume that all fishers face the same per-individual price for each stock (i.e. 
pi(Ni(t)) is the same for all fishing units) for simplicity, but some possible implications of 
violations of this assumption are discussed. The total profits of fishers in fishing unit j at 
time t, πj(t), are thus given by, 
€ 
π j t( ) = E j t( ) pi Ni t( )( )qijNi t( ) −1i=1
S
∑( )  (1b). 
Métiers and efficiency are defined mathematically by partitioning qij into two 
components: mij (where ∑imij = 1), a fraction representing the métier’s catch rate of stock 
i relative to other stocks, and ej, another constant representing fishing unit j’s efficiency, 
such that qij = mijej.  With this substitution, equations (1a) and (1b) become: 
€ 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( ) −mije jE j t( )( )   (2a) 
 
€ 
π j t( ) = E j t( ) e j pi Ni t( )( )mijNi t( ) −1i=1
S
∑( )  (2b). 
It can be seen from equations (2a) and (2b) that {mij}∀i captures the relative catch rates of 
different stocks by fishers in fishing unit j (i.e. its métier), and ej captures the cost 
efficiency of catch in fishing unit j, controlling for relative catch rates and stock 
abundances (i.e. its technical efficiency).  With multiple fishing units in the fishery 
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(where the number of fishing units is denoted J), the rate of change of the abundance of 
stock i is given by: 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( )− mijejEj t( )j=1
J
∑( )   (2c). 
At equilibrium, dNi(t)/dt = 0 for all i, and dEj(t)/dt = 0 for all j. For stock i, this 
means that: 
Ni* = 0 	  or gi N*( ) = mijejEj*j=1J∑   (3), 
(by equation 2c), where Ni* is the equilibrium abundance of stock i, N* = {N1*,…,NS*} 
and Ej* is the equilibrium fishing effort in fishing unit j. Assumptions about the 
determinants of effort levels depend on the management context. In managed fisheries, I 
assume effort levels (i.e. Ej(t) and Ej* for all j) are controllable by managers. The range of 
possible equilibria is determined by the diversity in the métiers ({{mij}∀i}∀j) and 
efficiencies ({ej}∀j) of available fishing units in the fleet. Equation (3) represents the 
manner in which this range is constrained by fleet diversity and by the ecology of the 
stocks (represented by gi(N*) for each stock i). The specific equilibrium in any managed 
fishery will be determined by this available range of possible equilibria, the management 
objective (e.g. yields, profits, etc.), and the degree to which efforts can be controlled by 
the managers. My analysis of managed fisheries focuses on exploring the effects of fleet 
diversity on the ranges of different management objectives that are technologically and 
ecologically achievable. To do this, I assume that Ej’s are completely controllable, and 
thus do not compare specific management instruments. In unmanaged fisheries, I assume 
that effort levels respond to profits, and equilibrium outcomes are ultimately determined 
by competition, as discussed in detail in the relevant section below. 
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Fleet diversity in managed fisheries 
In managed fisheries, fleet diversity provides management with more degrees of 
freedom, which increases the achievable fishery-wide yields and profits, and creates 
opportunities to reduce tradeoffs between fishery yields and profits and minimizing 
adverse impacts on weak stocks and other species.  Specifically, diversity in efficiency 
creates opportunities for management to increase fishery-wide profits by implementing a 
policy that causes the most efficient fishers to take larger shares of the catch. Higher 
diversity in efficiency also increases the likelihood of having high-efficiency extremes in 
the fishery, as a result of a sampling effect (see Appendix B for mathematical proof; 
Tilman et al. 1997 for analogous proof of the sampling effect of biodiversity on 
ecosystem productivity). Diversity in métiers in multispecies fisheries expands the 
spectrum of possible relative aggregate catch rates of different stocks, which increases 
achievable fishery-wide yields and profits, and creates opportunities for management to 
reconcile profit-and yield-maximization with prevention of overfishing and other 
ecological objectives (Figure 1, Figure B1; see Appendix B for expanded mathematical 
treatment).   
With few different métiers in a multispecies fishery, profits, yields, and 
management goals for different stocks often tradeoff with one another as a result of 
fishers’ lack of control over the relative catch-rates of different stocks in the fishery 
(Boyce 1996; Squires et al. 1998) (Figure 1a,b).  As a result, it is often impossible to set a 
target catch or effort-quota that does not either over-exploit some stocks or under-exploit 
others (Figure 1b).  However, a multispecies fishery with multiple métiers that are 
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diverse in their relative catch rates can achieve a much wider range of combinations of 
exploitation rates and equilibrium abundances of its stocks.  This is accomplished by 
influencing both total fishing effort and relative fishing efforts among métiers through 
management (Figure 1c; see Appendix B).       
To be precise, in a multispecies fishery with only a single métier, j, the set of 
possible equilibrium abundances of different stocks is constrained to a one-dimensional 
hypersurface (i.e. a curve), defined by equation (3), whose shape is largely determined by 
the stocks’ relative catch rates in the métier and their relative population growth rates 
(Figure 1a,b; Burgess et al. 2013). I hereafter refer to this as the ‘vulnerability constraint’ 
of métier j, because the relative catch rates and population growth rates of stocks 
determine their relative ‘vulnerabilities’ to depletion by métier j (Burgess et al. 2013). 
For example, if all stocks have logistic population growth (gi(.) = ri(1 – (Ni/Ki)) for all i, 
where ri is the maximum per-capita growth rate and Ki is the carrying capacity of stock i 
(Schaefer 1954)), then the equilibrium abundances, Nx* and Ny*, of any two non-extinct 
stocks, x and y, must satisfy:   
€ 
1− Nx
*
Kx
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
1− Ny
*
Ky
# 
$ 
% % 
& 
' 
( ( 
=
mxj
rx
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
myj
ry
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
  (4). 
Equation (4) is derived by combining equation (3) for both stock x and stock y, under the 
assumptions of logistic growth and a single fishing unit, j; and defines the vulnerability 
constraint of métier j in this logistic model, which is linear with a slope determined by the 
relative values of mij/ri (normalized catchability/maximum growth rate) for different 
stocks (see also Holt 1977; Clark 1985). The shapes of vulnerability constraints under 
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some other types of ecological assumptions are discussed in Appendix A, and illustrated 
in Figure A1a-e.   
In a multispecies fishery with multiple métiers, any desired combination of stocks’ 
equilibrium abundances that lies in the region in population space bounded by the 
vulnerability constraints of the different métiers could be achieved by implementing a 
policy or management strategy that influences both the total effort fishery-wide and 
relative efforts in different métiers (Figure 1c).  This is illustrated mathematically in 
Appendix B.  The space of possible sets of equilibrium stock abundances in a fishery has 
a dimensionality determined by the number of different métiers.  Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that a particular target set of stock abundances in a managed fishery will be 
achievable if there are fewer métiers than stocks to be managed.  This is also shown 
mathematically in Appendix B, and illustrated graphically in Figure B1.  Additionally, 
because the relative impacts of a métier on different stocks are determined by the relative 
vulnerabilities of stocks to the métier (mij/ri in the logistic model) rather than simply their 
relative catch rates (mij), it is the diversity in relative vulnerabilities of stocks among 
métiers (i.e. differences in {(mij/ri)}∀i rather than {mij}∀i) that is particularly important in 
providing opportunities for yield and profit gains in managed fisheries.      
 Figure 2 shows the results of stochastic simulations of a 5-stock fishery 
illustrating the opportunities that fleet diversity offers managed fisheries for increases in 
yields and profits, and reduction in weak stock collapses by avoiding the inter-stock 
tradeoffs common in multispecies fisheries.  For simplicity, each stock is assumed to 
have logistic population growth and constant prices, though the qualitative results 
generalize to more complex models.  Each simulation fixes the number of fishing units 
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and randomly generates 500 parameter sets, {ri, mij, ej, Ki} for all i and j (ri, (mij/ri) ~ 
U[0,1] (mij’s are normalized after each draw to sum to 1); ej ~ U[1,10]; Ki ~ U[10,100]; 
for simplicity, pi is fixed at 1 for all stocks, as Ki already provides a randomly selected 
determinant of the relative values of the same per-capita catch rate from different stocks), 
and sets equilibrium fishing efforts, Ej* for all j, in order to maximize either yield (Figure 
2a) or profit (Figure 2b) from all 5 stocks combined.  The maximum achievable yield 
(MAY) or profit (MAP) with each parameter set is compared to the theoretical maximum 
yield (MTY; the sum of maximum sustainable yields (MSY) for all stocks) or profit 
(MTP) achievable given the stocks’ ecological parameters and the bounds on efficiency 
placed on the random selection of fishing units.  The average number of stocks persisting 
at the achievable maximum (MAY or MAP) is also reported.  This procedure was 
repeated for both yield- (Figure 2a) and profit-maximization (Figure 2b), allowing 
métiers only, efficiencies only, or both to vary among fishing units within each random 
draw. 
  As the theory predicts, diversifying métiers increased the average maximum 
achievable yields (Figure 2a) and profits (Figure 2b).  Diversifying métiers also reduced 
the average frequency of stock extinctions required for yield- or profit-maximization 
(Figure 2) by creating opportunities for management to avoid tradeoffs between 
overexploiting some stocks and under-exploiting others by influencing relative effort 
allocations among métiers.  Diversifying efficiency increased achievable profits (Figure 
2b), but had no effect on the achievability of yields (Figure 2a) or stock extinction 
frequencies at the optima (Figure 2).  Results are qualitatively similar with mij and ri 
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drawn independently, but yields and profits increase more slowly with diversity of 
métiers, and saturate at higher diversities. 
  
Fleet diversity in unmanaged fisheries 
 In an unmanaged fishery, effort levels are driven by profits and eventually 
determined by the conditions that make further effort unprofitable (Clark 1976) (Figure 
3a).  The impacts of fleet diversity on yields, profits, and stocks (Figure 4) are mediated 
by competition between fishers (Figure 3b,c,d).  Competition tends to favour the most 
efficient fishers in the fishery (Figure 3b), and the likelihood of having high efficiency 
extremes in a fishing fleet increases with its diversity via a sampling effect (see Appendix 
B; Tilman et al. 1997). As a result, fleet diversification tends to lead to greater aggregate 
efficiency (Figure 4a), which allows profits at lower stock abundances and thereby often 
leads to decreases in long-term yields and increases in the frequency and severity of stock 
collapses (Figure 4b).  Competition among fishers in different métiers tends to either 
favour métiers with more balanced exploitation rates (Figure 3c) or result in co-existence 
(Figure 3d), both of which lead to more balanced aggregate exploitation rates (Figure 4a), 
often resulting in higher yields and fewer stock collapses (Figure 4b). Fleet diversity has 
little to no effect on long-term profits, as they tend towards zero at any diversity of 
fishing units, provided there is no monopoly or oligopoly in the fleet’s ownership (Clark 
1976).       
 To illustrate these points graphically (Figures 3 and 4) and mathematically (see 
also Appendix C), I assume (following Clark (1976; 1985)) that fishing effort within an 
individual fishing unit increases when profits are positive, decreases when they are 
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negative, and stays constant when profits are 0 (i.e. revenues are exactly equal to 
opportunity costs).  In other words, I assume, for fishing unit j, that dEj(t)/dt < 0 if πj(t) < 
0, dEj(t)/dt > 0 if πj(t) > 0, and dEj(t)/dt = 0 if πj(t) = 0.  I do not make specific 
assumptions about the rate or manner in which effort adjusts to profit conditions.  Thus, 
in a fishery catching S stocks with only a single fishing unit, j, equilibrium would occur at 
a set of stock abundances, N*j = {N1*j,…,NS*j}, satisfying:   
€ 
e j pi Ni* j( )mijNi* j =1i=1
S
∑   (5). 
Equation (5) (derived by setting πj(t) = 0 in equation (2b)) defines an S – 1 dimensional 
surface on which N*j must lie, which I hereafter refer to as the ‘profitability constraint’ of 
fishing unit j.  Similarly to the vulnerability constraint, the term ‘profitability constraint’ 
here refers to the fact that equilibrium abundances are constrained to this surface, rather 
than referring to other common uses of the term ‘constraint’ in mathematics (e.g. in 
optimization or control theory). The profitability constraint is illustrated in Figure 3 under 
the assumption of constant prices (where it is linear) and in Figure A1f under the 
assumption of increasing prices with decreasing abundance (where it is generally convex, 
see Appendix A). Its slope is determined by the métier (Figure 3c,d) and its position 
relative to the origin is determined by efficiency (Figure 3b).  Equilibrium with a single 
fishing unit occurs at the intersection of its vulnerability and profitability constraints 
(Figure 3a) – where all dNi(t)/dt = 0, and dEj(t)/dt = 0 because πj(t) = 0.  
Competition between fishing units for fish has strong parallels with ecological 
communities of consumers competing for resources, which have been extensively studied.  
One of the seminal results in ecological competition theory is that outcomes of 
competition depend largely on species’ abilities to invade communities of their 
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competitors – meaning they have positive growth rates when they are rare and 
competitors are established (MacArthur and Levins 1964; Levin 1970; Tilman 1980).  As 
Tilman (1980) illustrates graphically and mathematically, if two species are competing 
and: i) each can invade the other’s equilibrium, they co-exist; ii) one can invade the 
other’s equilibrium, but not vice versa, the successful invader will competitively exclude 
the other; iii) neither can invade the other’s equilibrium, one species will exclude the 
other, but which wins will depend on which establishes first or increases in population 
faster (called a ‘priority effect’).  The same principles apply to competing fishing units, 
except that it turns out that priority effects require fishers from pairs of fishing units to 
receive oppositely differing prices for the same catch of at least one pair of stocks (e.g. 
fishing unit j receives a higher price than fishing unit k for stock x but a lower price for 
stock y; see Appendix C, Figure C1).  Thus, priority effects may be relatively uncommon. 
There are some additional complexities when equilibria are not stable (e.g. see McGehee 
and Armstrong 1977; Armstrong and McGehee 1980), which I do not consider explicitly 
here for brevity, but do not affect the general principle that outcomes of competition are 
driven by species’ (or analogously, fishing units’) abilities to invade each other’s 
established populations (Armstrong and McGehee 1980), and thus should also not affect 
the qualitative results I present concerning the effects of diversity of métiers and 
efficiency on yields and ecological outcomes.   
As illustrated in Figure 3b, competition favours efficiency because more efficient 
fishers can still make profits at stock abundances resulting in zero profits for less efficient 
fishers within the same métier.  This can be easily shown by substituting ek (ek > ej) into 
equation (5) for ej, which would transform the equation to an inequality (i.e. πk(N*j) > 0).  
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Similarly, less efficient fishers make negative profits at the equilibria of more efficient 
fishers of the same métier (πj(N*k) < 0), which would eventually force them to exit the 
fishery.  Because competition favours efficiency, and because increasing diversity 
increases the likelihood of including high efficiency extremes (see Appendix B), 
increasing fleet diversity should increase the aggregate efficiency of unmanaged fleets, 
on average (see Appendix C). 
A high diversity of métiers is more likely to lead to balanced exploitation of the 
stocks in a fishery than a low diversity of métiers for two reasons: 1) competition among 
fishers with equal efficiency tends to favour those in métiers with more balanced 
exploitation of the different stocks (Figure 3c); and 2) competitive co-existence between 
fishers in two different métiers leads to aggregate relative exploitation rates among stocks 
that are intermediate to those that would be produced by each métier individually (Figure 
3d).  Specifically, in a fishery in which all fishing units have the same efficiency and all 
mij between 0 and 1 are technologically feasible for any stock, i, (i.e. all possible métiers 
are feasible) competition among an infinitely diverse initial pool of métiers (i.e. a pool 
including all possible métiers) results in relative equilibrium abundances, Nx* and Ny*, of 
any two extant stocks, x and y, satisfying (see Appendix C): 
€ 
px Nx*( )Nx* = py Ny*( )Ny*   (6). 
In other words, all extant stocks have relative equilibrium abundances equal to the 
inverse of their equilibrium price-ratios (i.e. (px*/py*) = (Ny*/Nx*), where pi* = pi(Ni*)).   
 This occurs because: i) in a fishery in which all fishers are equally efficient, there 
exists a métier that can invade and disrupt any equilibrium point not satisfying equation 
(6) (e.g. métier 2 in Figure 3c); and ii) co-existence among multiple fishing units occurs 
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at equilibrium stock sizes at the intersection their profitability constraints (Figure 3d), and 
all possible profitability constraints with a particular efficiency intersect at a single point, 
at which equation (6) is satisfied (Figure 3c,d).  Point ii) can be easily derived from 
equations (5) and (6) (see Appendix C). To illustrate point i), suppose a fishery in which 
all fishers have the same efficiency is at an equilibrium, N* = {N1*,…, NS*}, not satisfying 
equation (6). This implies that there is at least one pair of stocks, x and y, with the 
property px(Nx*)Nx* > py(Ny*)Ny*.  Given this fact, any new fishing unit, k, with the 
property relative to any established fishing unit, j, that mxk > mxj, myk < myj, and mik = mij 
for all i ≠ x,y, will have positive profits at this equilibrium, and thus be able to invade the 
fishery.  Moreover, the invasion of fishing unit k would increase the overall mortality rate 
of stock x relative to stock y, which would reduce Nx* relative to Ny*.  Assuming that 
d[pi(Ni*)Ni*]/dNi* > 0 (i = x, y) (i.e. revenues from any stock are positively related to its 
abundance), this would decrease the difference between px(Nx*)Nx* and py(Ny*)Ny*, which 
would iteratively lead to equation (6) being satisfied if diversity increased infinitely (i.e. 
if all possible métiers were given the opportunity to try to invade the fishery).   
 Putting the results concerning efficiency and balanced exploitation together: 
In an unmanaged fishery, where all métiers are feasible for any efficiency up to a 
maximum efficiency, eMAX, and métiers are independent of efficiencies, infinite initial 
fleet diversity results in an equilibrium, denoted N**eMAX , at which equation (6) holds for 
all extant stocks, and all persisting fishing units have efficiency eMAX (see Appendix C 
for expanded proof).  To be precise,N**eMAX = N1**eMAX,...,NS**eMAX{ }  solves (from equations 
(5) and (6)), 
pi Ni**eMAX( )Ni**eMAX = 1eMAX   (7), 
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for all extant stocks.  This is illustrated in a stochastic simulation of a fishery targeting 
two stocks having logistic growth and constant prices in Figure 4a (see caption for 
parameter values/distributions).  As fleet diversity increases, the distribution of equilibria 
concentrates at N**eMAX (Figure 4a). 
 Of course, the convergence of stock sizes, as a result of fleet diversification, to the 
equilibrium, N**eMAX , described by equation (7), depends on the assumption that 
efficiencies are distributed independently from métiers (i.e. eMAX is the same for all 
métiers).  In reality, however, this is not likely to be the case.  For example, if some 
stocks are generally easier or cheaper to catch than others due to their range or ecology, 
métiers with higher relative catch rates of these stocks are likely to be more efficient.  
One simple way to consider this in the modeling framework presented here is to let qij = 
ejaimij, where ej measures the overall efficiency of fishing unit j that is independent of its 
target stock, and ai (ai > 0) measures how easy stock i is to catch relative to other stocks.  
With this definition of qij, increasing fleet diversity in a fishery with maximum efficiency, 
eMAX, will drive equilibrium stock abundances towards an equilibrium, N**eMAX , described 
by:    
pi Ni**eMAX( )aiNi**eMAX = 1eMAX   (8), 
where px Nx**eMAX( )axNx**eMAX = py Ny**eMAX( )ayNy**eMAX  for any two stocks, x and y.  Equation 
(8) is derived using identical logic as equation (7) (see Appendix C). The general 
qualitative result is that diversification of métiers will tend to drive stocks towards 
relative abundances at which they generate equal revenue per-dollar spent on effort for 
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equally efficient classes of technology, and diversification in efficiency will tend to 
broadly decrease stocks’ abundances.   
 By promoting balanced exploitation, diversification of métiers will often lead to 
higher yields and reduce the likelihood of weak stock collapses. In contrast, 
diversification of efficiency will often reduce yields and increase the likelihood of weak 
stock collapses in by promoting high aggregate efficiency. Figure 4b illustrates an 
example of such patterns in a stochastic simulation of the same 2-stock fishery as in 
Figure 4a (see caption for parameter values/distributions).  
 Provided efficiency is finite, N**eMAX will occur at a positive abundance for each 
commercially valued stock (i.e. each stock with a positive price) (by equation (7)/(8), see 
Figure 4a).  Thus, the effect diversifying métiers reducing the likelihood of weak stock 
collapses will often dominate the opposite effect of diversifying efficiency at high 
diversities of both (because Ni**eMAX > 0  for all i), meaning that broad increases in fleet 
diversity should often reduce the threat of weak stock collapses, as is the case in the 
simulated example in Figure 4b.  However, whether the positive effect of diversifying 
métiers on equilibrium yield dominates the negative effect of diversifying efficiency will 
be much more context-dependent – driven largely by the maximum feasible efficiency, 
eMAX.  If eMAX is sufficiently large, as in the simulated example in Figure 4b, the effect of 
métier diversification increasing yield may dominate at very low fleet diversity, but the 
efficiency effect may dominate at higher diversity as the métier effect saturates.  
However, it is possible for the effect of diversifying métiers to dominate at high fleet 
diversity if eMAX is sufficiently small.   
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 While these results likely generalize to many types of fleets and fished stocks, 
there are some important exceptions.  In particular, as discussed in Appendix D and 
illustrated in Figure D1, diversification in either métiers or efficiency often leads to the 
collapse of stocks whose non-substitutable prey or mutualists are also caught in the 
fishery; and diversifying métiers can sometimes increase the likelihood of stock collapses 
in fisheries where technological limitations make some relative catch-rates infeasible.  
Additionally, any stock whose price can rise fast enough to increase the revenues it 
generates as its abundance falls (i.e. d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0 for stock i) is likely to be fished 
to extinction in general (Courchamp et al. 2006), but diversifying métiers or efficiency 
can also increase the chances of this (see Appendix A).  
 For by-catch populations, having little or no commercial value, the effect of 
diversifying métiers on the likelihood of collapse depends on the range of feasible 
relative catch rates and the way in which by-catch rates impact the efficiency of catching 
commercially valued stocks.  If by-catch comes at an efficiency cost, then diversifying 
métiers could reduce impacts on by-catch species, as low-by-catch métiers would be 
favoured by competition.  In contrast, if by-catch mitigation comes at an efficiency cost, 
then diversifying métiers could have the opposite effect, increasing the impacts on by-
catch species.  Diversifying métiers could similarly increase impacts on by-catch species 
if low-by-catch technologies were infeasible.   
   
Discussion  
 This study presents two broad theoretical results: I) Diversifying métiers in 
multispecies fisheries often leads to higher yields and less overfishing in both managed 
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and unmanaged fisheries – by creating opportunities to reduce tradeoffs between 
management objectives for different stocks and encouraging balanced exploitation in 
unmanaged fisheries. II) Diversifying technical efficiency creates opportunities for 
greater profits in managed fisheries, but tends to lead to more severe depletions (and thus 
lower yields) in unmanaged fisheries.  Together, these results suggest that the potential 
value of transitioning to management in a fishery often increases with the diversity of its 
fleet.  
The results concerning managed fisheries follow directly from the principle that 
more diverse fleets give managers more possible combinations of relative catch rates and 
costs (i.e. more degrees of freedom), with which they can more effectively balance 
objectives for different stocks and minimize costs, through controls influencing both total 
fishery-wide effort and relative efforts among different types of fishers.  The results 
concerning unmanaged fisheries follow from the following principles of competition 
among fishers: i) All else equal, fishers with high technical efficiency (i.e. they obtain 
catches low costs relative to other fishers, with stock abundances being equal) will tend 
to outcompete less efficient fishers, and high efficiency extremes are more likely to be 
found in a diverse fishery. ii) If a particular fishing fleet is exploiting commercially 
valued stocks highly asymmetrically relative to their prices and abundances, and 
technology exists to adopt an alternate fishing practice that better targets a currently 
underexploited stock, someone will eventually adopt this practice and profitably enter the 
fishery, increasing the overall fishing pressure on the previously underexploited stock 
relative to others (i.e. balancing exploitation) as a result.  Greater diversity in fishing 
technology increases the likelihood that technology will exist to exploit such economic 
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opportunities.  iii) Métiers with highly different catch profiles (relative catch-rates among 
stocks) compete less, and are likely to coexist in a fishery, resulting in relative aggregate 
catch rates among stocks that are intermediate to those each métier would produce on its 
own (e.g. Figure 3d).  Greater diversity in métiers increases the likelihood of finding 
catch profiles across the full range in the fishery, thus more likely resulting in balanced 
aggregate exploitation.  
Though these principles, and the results (I) and II)) they imply, are illustrated 
mathematically in this paper using simplifying assumptions that may be unrealistic – 
notably: a) that fleet diversity can be partitioned into discrete fishing units, each with 
uniform relative catch rates and efficiency; b) that unmanaged fishery equilibria are 
stable enough for basic equilibrium-based competition results in theoretical ecology 
(Tilman 1980; see Armstrong and McGehee 1980) to hold; and c) all fishers face the 
same prices for catch of each stock – they are likely to be more general. Similar 
theoretical simplifications have been used, for example, to conceptually illustrate some of 
the mechanisms underlying positive effects of biodiversity on ecosystem productivity 
(e.g. Tilman et al. 1997), which have proven to be robust both theoretically and 
empirically to many added complexities (see Cardinale et al. 2006, 2011 respectively for 
recent meta-analysis and review).  
Thus, these model simplifications (a), b) and c) above) should be thought of as 
conceptual tools for understanding broad results, rather than accurate descriptions of 
reality.  It is likely that some unmanaged fisheries have unstable or cyclic dynamics.  
Relative catch rates – the defining characteristic of métiers – and technical efficiency are 
likely to vary continuously, such that no two fishers are identical.  However, there is 
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empirical evidence that métiers can be grouped somewhat discretely into groups of 
vessels with highly similar relative catch rates (Branch et al. 2005), and it is possible that 
the same is true for efficiency.  For example, vessels of similar size with similar distances 
between ports of origin and fishing grounds may have similar fuel and labour costs.  Thus, 
the fleet diversity that is important in practice is likely to be the number of these different 
semi-discrete vessel ‘types’, and more importantly, how different they are from one 
another in their efficiency and relative catch rates.  Fishers in different métiers may 
sometimes face different prices for the same catch.  For example, fish caught in passive 
gears (e.g. traps, longlines) are often higher quality (e.g. FAO 2002), and thus sometimes 
fetch higher prices than fish caught in active gears (e.g. trawls, seines). However, 
differences in prices faced by different fishing units that are proportionally consistent 
across stocks (e.g. fishing unit j receives prices twice as high as fishing unit k for all 
stocks) are mathematically equivalent to differences in efficiency, and thus should not 
impact the results.  
Recent studies of specific fisheries provide some support for the benefits of 
diversity in métiers in both managed and unmanaged contexts.  For example, Dougherty 
et al. (2013) showed, theoretically and in simulations of western U.S. groundfish fisheries, 
that setting multispecies harvest quotas at a local scale to achieve coast-wide goals could 
increase overall fishery yields without increasing the likelihood of collapsing any of the 
stocks.  If métiers vary spatially due to the varying juxtapositions of species’ ranges on 
different fishing grounds, the type of management Dougherty et al. (2013) propose is 
equivalent to regulating the relative efforts in different métiers.  Similar results have been 
found in several other multispecies fisheries (Sanchirico et al. 2006; Marchal et al. 2011; 
	   25	  
Ulrich et al. 2011; Sibert et al. 2012).  Burgess et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting 
that the diversification of métiers in Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries resulting 
from the expansion of industrial deep-set longline, purse-seine and pole-and-line fishing 
methods reduced the long-term threat of collapse posed by these fisheries to many tuna 
and billfish populations by tending to increase the balance in their exploitation rates.   
There is also some empirical support for the ideas that fishers with high technical 
efficiencies can competitively dominate diverse fleets and increase overfishing, and that 
management can exploit differences among fishers’ technical efficiencies to increase 
fishery-wide profits.  For example, Schnier and Felthoven (2013) found that the 
introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQ) in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island 
crab fishery increased the likelihood of inefficient fishers exiting the fishery.  This is 
consistent with theory suggesting that rights-based fishery management leads to fishery-
wide efficiency by incentivizing the redistribution of fishing effort to more efficient 
fishers (Grafton et al. 2000).  Similar results have been seen in other fisheries (e.g. 
Weninger 1998; 2008; Brandt 2007; Costello et al. 2010; Grainger and Costello 2012).  
In unmanaged fisheries, the rise of industrial fishing in the mid-20th century and 
subsequent fishery collapses (e.g. Myers and Worm 2003; Pauly et al. 2005; Worm et al. 
2006; 2009) may be a consequence of the ability of efficient fishers to competitively 
dominate fisheries, and the increases in ecological risk associated with efficiency gains.    
 Though the results presented here suggest that management is likely to face fewer 
tradeoffs between yield- or profit-maximization and species conservation in diverse fleets, 
it is important to note that the structures of some food webs may make such tradeoffs 
difficult or impossible to overcome, regardless of fleet diversity.  For example, if a 
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fishery targets both a predator and its prey, maximizing yield or profit across the whole 
fishery might require the elimination of the predator to increase prey catches.  Matsuda 
and Abrams (2006) explore such tradeoffs in detail and outline several instructive 
examples.  Similarly, as discussed in Appendix D, diversification of either métiers or 
efficiency in unmanaged fisheries may exacerbate indirect threats from fisheries to some 
specialist predators and mutualists.  The vulnerability of top predators and other marine 
species to fishing-induced trophic cascades has been documented both empirically (e.g. 
Estes et al. 1998; Jackson et al. 2001; Frank et al. 2005; Myers et al. 2007) and 
theoretically (e.g. May et al. 1979).  Ecosystem-based fishery management (Pikitch et al. 
2004) or other holistic approaches to fishery management may be particularly important 
in large fisheries with diverse fleets.   
The focus of my analysis of unmanaged fisheries on equilibrium statics rather 
than dynamics did not allow the analysis to consider the possibility of transient stock 
collapses, effects of fleet diversity on the temporal variance in yields and profits, or the 
stability of fished ecosystems.  Fleet diversity likely plays an important role in 
determining the stability of fishing yields and profits, and fished stocks.  Ecological 
theory suggests that increasing biological diversity decreases the stability of individual 
species’ populations (May 1973), but increases the stability of aggregate ecosystem 
services such as productivity (Lehman and Tilman 2000).  This suggests that increasing 
fleet diversity may analogously destabilize the populations of individual stocks or the 
profits of fishers in individual fishing units, but may increase the stability of fishery-wide 
yields and profits.  Recent evidence from California Current fisheries suggests that 
fisheries can indeed destabilize individual fish populations (Hsieh et al. 2006; Anderson 
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et al. 2008). By decreasing the stability of individual stocks, increasing fleet diversity 
may also increase the likelihood of transient stock collapses.  The effects of fleet 
diversity on the stability of the economic and ecological impacts of fisheries merit further 
study.    
Fisheries are an important global provider of food, employment, and other social 
benefits (Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009; Costello et al. 2012a; Chan et al. 
2012), but also have large and increasing ecological impacts (Worm et al. 2006, 2009; 
Costello et al. 2012b; Halpern et al. 2012; Ricard et al. 2012).  With global fish demand 
rising (Delgado et al. 2003) and global protein demand expected to double in the next 
half-century (Tilman et al. 2011), fisheries management faces the delicate challenge of 
providing the highest possible levels of sustainable production at the lowest possible 
ecological cost.  The theory presented here, for which there is some empirical support in 
the literature, broadly suggests that diversifying métiers can have positive impacts on the 
yields and ecological sustainability of both managed and unmanaged multispecies 
fisheries.  My analysis also suggests that the potential of management to improve 
fisheries’ socio-economic and ecological outcomes relative to unmanaged outcomes is 
likely to be highest in diverse fishing fleets.  Large international fishing fleets targeting 
widespread or migratory stocks, such as those targeting tunas, are likely to be diverse, but 
are also some of the most difficult to manage (Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009).  
Continued advances in the management of these fisheries will be critical to ensuring the 
long-term sustainability of the socioeconomic benefits of fisheries and the ecosystems 
that support them.  In the meantime, continuing to diversify métiers in multispecies 
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fisheries may reduce threats to some weak stocks even without management (e.g. Burgess 
et al. 2013).  
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Figure 1. Total and relative efforts and achievable abundances in managed fisheries. 
(a) With a single métier in a fishery, stocks’ relative equilibrium abundances are 
constrained by their relative vulnerabilities to the métier.  The ‘vulnerability constraint’ 
of a métier (red line for Métier 1) is the set of possible equilibrium abundances with no 
other métiers present in the fishery. Open circles represent some of these possible 
equilibrium abundances. (b) As a result, with a single métier (or few relative to the 
number of stocks) in a multispecies fishery it is often impossible to simultaneously 
achieve target abundances for multiple stocks, instead trading off overexploiting some 
with under-exploiting others, as illustrated by the open circles representing the equilibria 
resulting from harvesting one of the stocks at its target abundance.  (c) With multiple 
métiers, management influencing both their relative and total effort levels can produce 
any set of equilibrium stock abundances within the region (shaded) bounded by the 
vulnerability constraints each would produce in isolation (red and blue lines). Increasing 
diversity of métiers increases the chances of this region including the target set of 
abundances (shown as an open circle). 
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Figure 2. Fleet diversity increases achievable yields and profits in managed fisheries. 
Results of a 5-stock stochastic simulation of average relationships between fleet diversity 
and achievable yields and profits with (a) optimal management for obtaining maximum 
achievable yield (MAY) and (b) optimal management for obtaining maximum achievable 
profit (MAP).  Average maximum achievable (a) yields (MAY) and (b) profits (MAP) 
are shown (black) along with the average number of extinctions achieving MAY or MAP 
requires (grey).  Each point represents a sample of 500 models with randomly chosen 
parameter values.  Vertical lines indicate standard errors. Note: points in (a) showing 
simulation results with diverse métiers only (black squares, black dashed line), and those 
showing results with diversity in both métiers and efficiency (black circles, black solid 
line) are nearly identical. This is due to the fact that diversity in efficiency among fishing 
units has no effect on achievable yields.  
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Figure 3. Competition in unmanaged fisheries. (a) With one fishing unit, equilibrium 
occurs at the intersection of the vulnerability constraint and profitability constraints (N*1 
for fishing unit 1). (b) If fishers are in the same métier, more efficient fishers will 
outcompete less efficient fishers (competitive equilibrium is denoted N*1&2). (c), (d) As 
métiers diversify with equal efficiency, equilibrium abundances will tend toward 
equalization of (price x abundance) is equal for all stocks (tan dashed line), either via (c) 
competitive exclusion, (d) co-existence, or both.  The profitability constraints of all 
fishing units with equal efficiency (red and blue dashed lines in (c) and (d)) intersect at a 
single point where (price x abundance) is equal for all stocks (as drawn, p2 > p1).  
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Figure 4. Consequences of fleet diversification in unmanaged fisheries.  (a) A 
stochastic simulation showing the frequency distribution of equilibria (N*) in a 2 stock 
fishery in which 1, 2, and 3 fishing units respectively (from left to right) were randomly 
drawn 15 000 times from a uniform distribution of all possible métiers (mij ~ U[0,1]) and 
a bounded range of efficiencies (ej ~ U[1,12]).  Stocks were assumed to have logistic 
growth with ri, Ki = 1 for i = 1, 2 and p1 = 1, p2 = 2. Grey lines represent all possible 
intersections of vulnerability and profitability constraints for the most (large dashes) and 
least (small dashes) efficient fishers. As a result of competition among fishers, increasing 
fleet diversity increases causes the probability of having the most efficient possible 
exploitation and stock abundances where (price x abundance) are equal at equilibrium 
(
€ 
N**eMAX , intersection of grey and black dashed lines) approaches 1.  (b) A stochastic 
simulation with the same parameter values and distributions as (a), where each of 1 to 30 
fishing units are drawn randomly 1000 times, with métiers and efficiencies varying 
separately and jointly.  When only métiers vary, diversification leads to higher yields 
(black) and fewer extinctions (grey) on average by balancing exploitation. When only 
efficiencies vary, diversification has the opposite effect, by reducing equilibrium 
abundances. When both métiers and efficiencies vary, the probability density of 
equilibrium abundances concentrates at 
€ 
N**eMAX as diversity increases. As a result, the 
effect of métiers’ diversity reducing extinctions dominates (grey), but in this case the 
effect of efficiencies reducing average equilibrium yields also dominates (black).  Error 
bars shown are standard errors (n = 1000). 
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Appendices for: 
Consequences of fleet diversification in managed and unmanaged fisheries 
Matthew G. Burgess 
 
Appendix A. Vulnerability and profitability constraints under different ecological 
and economic assumptions 
 
Vulnerability constraints 
 The vulnerability constraint of a particular fishing unit, j, is the set of possible 
equilibrium abundance vectors, N*, at different efforts with only unit j in the fishery.  The 
vulnerability constraint is mathematically defined by the system of equations (3) for each 
stock. From this system of equations, it follows that any pair of extant stocks, x and y, 
must satisfy the following at equilibrium:  
€ 
gx N*( )
gy N*( )
=
mxj
myj
  (A.1) 
As can be seen from equation (A.1), the vulnerability constraint is determined solely by 
the métier, and is not influenced by efficiency.  Additionally, because it is defined by a 
system of S – 1 unique equations, it will be a one dimensional curve with any number of 
stocks, S. Figure A1a-e illustrates vulnerability constraints in 2-stock models under 
different ecological assumptions (i.e. values of gi(.)), listed below.    
Figure A1a – No interaction: 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1− Ni t( ) Ki( )( ) , for i = 1, 2, where ri and Ki are 
positive constants respectively representing the maximum intrinsic per-capita growth rate 
and carrying capacity of stock i (sensu Schaefer 1954). 
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Figure A1b – Competition: 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1−
Ni t( ) +α ijN j t( )( )
Ki
$ 
% 
& 
& 
' 
( 
) 
) 
, for i, j = 1, 2, j ≠ i, where 
ri and Ki are the same as above, and αij is a positive constant representing the strength of 
the competitive effect of individuals of stock j on the growth rate of stock i (sensu 
MacArthur and Levins 1967).  Stable co-existence of both stocks in the absence of 
harvesting requires αij ≤ (Ki/Kj) for i, j = 1, 2.   
Figure A1c – Mutualism: 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1−
Ni t( ) −α ijN j t( )( )
Ki
$ 
% 
& 
& 
' 
( 
) 
) 
, for i, j = 1, 2, j ≠ i, where ri 
and Ki are the same as above, and αij is a positive constant representing the strength of 
the mutualistic effect of individuals of stock j on the growth rate of stock i.  
Figure A1d – Predator and non-essential prey: 
gpred N t( )( ) = rpred 1−
Npred t( )−αpredpreyNprey t( )( )
Kpred
"
#
$$
%
&
'' , 
gprey N t( )( ) = rprey 1−
Nprey t( )+αpreypredNpred t( )( )
Kprey
"
#
$$
%
&
'' , where ri and Ki are the same as above (i 
= pred, prey), and αpredprey and αpreypred are positive constants respectively representing the 
strength of the positive effect of prey on predator growth rates and predators on prey 
growth rates.  Note that the predator does not require any particular abundance of prey to 
survive (with no prey, the predator has logistic growth). 
Figure A1e – Predator and essential prey: gpred N t( )( ) = rpred
Nprey t( )− Nprey,MINpred( )
Kprey − Nprey,MINpred( )
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
'
, 
gprey N t( )( ) = rprey 1−
Nprey t( )+αpreypredNpred t( )( )
Kprey
"
#
$$
%
&
'' , where the prey growth is the same as in 
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Figure A1d, but the predator now needs a minimum abundance of prey, Nprey,MINpred to 
survive. 
 As illustrated in Figure A1 and in the main text for the logistic model (equation 
(4)), the shape of the vulnerability constraint is largely determined by the type of 
interaction (predation, competition, etc.), and by relative values of (mij/ri) in most 
communities.  
 
Profitability constraints 
 The profitability constraint of a particular fishing unit, j, is the set of abundance 
vectors, N, that result in zero profits for fishers in unit j.  It is defined mathematically by 
setting the right hand side of equation 2b equal to 0 (equivalent to equation (5)):  
€ 
e j pi Ni( )mijNi =1i=1
S
∑   (A.2). 
As can be seen from equation (A.2), the profitability constraint is determined by both the 
métier (its slope; Figure 3c,d) and the efficiency (its position relative to the origin; Figure 
3b) of fishers in fishing unit j.  It is an S – 1 dimensional surface, which is linear if prices 
are constant (Figure 3).  If prices increase as abundance decreases (piʹ′(.) < 0), but not fast 
enough to cause profits to increase with decreasing abundance (i.e. d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi > 0 for 
all Ni, i), the profitability constraint is generally convex, as illustrated for a 2-stock 
fishery in Figure A1f, because the decrease in price as the abundance of a stock increases 
generally results in diminishing marginal returns to stock abundance (i.e. d2[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi2 
< 0 for all Ni, i).  This is analogous to the property of convex isoquants as a result of 
diminishing marginal returns to production factors (e.g. capital, labour) in 
microeconomics (see Mas-Colell et al. 1995).  
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 If a stock, i, has the property that the revenues it generates increase as its 
abundance decreases (i.e. d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0), then it is likely to be driven extinct 
(Courchamp et al. 2006), and this likelihood can be exacerbated by increasing the 
diversity of métiers. If d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0 at current and all lower abundances, Ni, of 
stock i, then any fishing unit whose current revenues from only stock i are greater than its 
costs can profitably harvest stock i to extinction.  Increasing the diversity of either 
efficiency or métiers would increase the likelihood of including such a fishing unit by 
chance.  If d[pi(Ni)Ni]/dNi < 0 at current abundance of stock i but not abundances lower 
than a certain abundance (because of price saturation, for example), increasing the 
diversity of efficiency or métiers would increase the likelihood of including a fishing unit 
that could drive stock i to this abundance, at which point the theory presented in the main 
text would apply, and equilibrium at infinite fleet diversity would satisfy equation (6).  
Thus, equation (6) (equality of (price x abundance) across all extant revenue-generating 
stocks at equilibrium) is likely to be satisfied even if prices can increase faster than 
abundances decline for some stocks. 
  
Appendix B. Fleet diversity in managed fisheries: Expanded mathematical 
treatment 
Consider the model of an S-stock, J-fishing unit fishery from the main text, where 
equation (2c) describes the population growth of stock i: 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( )− mijejEj t( )j=1
J
∑( )   (2c), 
and equation (2b) describes the profits of fishing unit j at time t:   
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π j t( ) = Ej t( ) ej pi Ni t( )( )mijNi t( )i=1
S
∑ −1( )   (2b). 
In addition, it is instructive to formally partition fishing effort into total and relative 
efforts, by representing effort in fishing unit j, Ej(t) at time t (which is in monetary units), 
as the total cost-budget of the fishery as a whole (total effort), denoted E(t) at time t, 
multiplied by the fraction of this cost-budget allocated to fishing unit j (relative effort), 
denoted bj(t) at time t, where ∑jbj(t) = 1.  Thus, Ej(t) = E(t)bj(t). With this substitution, 
the fishery-wide yield (the sum of catch-rates across stocks and fishing units) at time t, 
Y(t) is given by: 
Y t( ) = Ni t( )Fi t( )i=1
S
∑   (B.1a), 
where Fi(t), the fishing mortality rate of stock i at time t, is given by: 
Fi t( ) = E t( ) bj t( )ejmijj=1
J
∑   (B.1b). 
The fishery-wide profits at time t, Π(t), are given by: 
Π t( ) = Ni t( )Fi t( )i=1
S
∑ pi Ni t( )( )"#$
%
&'−E t( )   (B.1c). 
At any equilibrium, {N*, E*} (E* = {E1*,…, EJ*), the population size of stock i 
cannot be changing (i.e. dNi t( ) dt( ) |Ni t( )=Ni*
!
"
#
$= 0 for all i) (by definition of equilibrium), 
which implies that harvest is equal to surplus production, 
Ni*gi N*( ) = Ni* mijejEj*j=1
J
∑   (B.2). 
This implies that equilibrium fishery-wide yields and profits can be expressed in terms of 
surplus production as: 
Y * = Ni*i=1
S
∑ gi N*( )   (B.3a). 
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Π * = pi Ni*( )Ni*gi N*( )i=1
S
∑ −E*  (B.3b). 
As can be seen from equation (B.3a), equilibrium fishery wide yield (Y*) depends on the 
equilibrium stock sizes (N*), but not the total fishing effort (i.e. cost), E*, needed to 
achieve these. In contrast, equilibrium fishery-wide profit depends on both the 
equilibrium stock sizes (N*), which determine yield and prices, and the total effort (E*), 
which is equal to the total cost because effort is defined in units of monetary cost 
throughout this analysis.  Moreover, every set of equilibrium stock abundances, N*, 
corresponds to a unique set of fishing mortality rates, F* = {F1*,…, FS*}. The uniqueness 
of F* given N* follows from equation (B.2).     
 The set of fishing mortality rates at time t, F(t), is given by:    
F t( ) = E t( ) M•β t( )( )  (B.4), 
where M is a matrix defining the set of métiers in the fishery, M = 
{{m11,…,m1J},…,{mS1,…,mSJ}}, and β(t) is a vector of the relative efforts in different 
fishing units (b) weighted by their efficiencies β(t) = {b1(t)e1,…,bJ(t)eJ}. It is possible for 
both E(t) and β(t) to be fully controlled by management under any set of efficiencies, 
{ej}∀j, provided all efficiencies are positive and there are no limits on total effort, E(t).  
Thus, the space of possible fishing mortality combinations, F, and by extension, 
equilibrium abundance combinations, N*, is defined solely by the set of métiers in the 
fishery (defined by the matrix M).  
Consequently, the maximum achievable yield (MAY) in a fishery, which is 
determined only by the space of achievable abundance combinations (from equation 
B.3a), is influenced by the available diversity of métiers in the fishery, but not by the 
available diversity of efficiencies.  Increasing the number of different métiers increases 
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the space of possible equilibrium abundance combinations, which increases the 
likelihood that the highest yielding (or revenue generating) abundance combinations will 
be achievable.  In fact, the addition of a new fishing unit, k, with a unique métier to a 
fishery cannot reduce the maximum yield (MAY) or revenue achievable through 
management, because any equilibrium abundance combination, N*, which was achievable 
before the introduction of fishing unit k would still be achievable by setting bk = 0.  By 
similar logic, increasing the diversity of métiers cannot possibly worsen tradeoffs 
between overexploiting some stocks and underexploiting others (because additional 
diversity in M cannot shrink the space of achievable abundances), and increasing 
diversity in efficiency has no effect on the existence of such tradeoffs. Thus, increasing 
the diversity of métiers in a managed fishery should lead to increases in achievable yields 
and revenues (and profits by extension) and lessen the ecological costs of yield or profit-
maximization. In contrast, increasing the diversity of efficiencies should have no effect 
on achievable yields or the tradeoffs between yield- or profit-maximization and 
conservation.  The simulation results in Figure 2 support these predictions. 
 The achievability of a particular target set of abundances, denoted NT (e.g. NMSY 
for all stocks, resulting in the maximum theoretical yield (MTY) fishery-wide), is 
unlikely unless there are at least as many métiers as stocks. Achieving the set of fishing 
mortality rates, FT, associated with NT requires total (ET) and relative (bT, βT) efforts 
solving: 
FT = ET M•βT( )  (B.5). 
An exact solution to this equation requires M to have a rank of S or greater, which 
requires at least S different métiers.  Figure B1 illustrates this graphically in a 3-stock 
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fishery.  When the dimensionality of the set of achievable abundance targets (determined 
by the number of different métiers) is smaller than the number of stocks, it is highly 
unlikely that a particular set of target abundances will be contained in this set (Figure 
B1a,b vs. c). 
 Though not impacting achievable yields or yield-conservation tradeoffs, the 
available diversity of efficiencies does impact the achievable fishery-wide profits.  
Diversity in efficiency creates opportunities to increase profits by redistributing fishing 
effort from low-efficiency fishing units to high efficiency fishing units. Moreover, 
increasing diversity in efficiencies also increases the likelihood of including high 
efficiency extremes, which causes fisheries with higher diversity in efficiency to have 
higher maximum achievable profit (MAP) on average, holding the diversity of métiers 
constant.   
As an illustrative example, suppose all fishing units have the same métier (i.e. mij 
= mik for all i,j,k), denoted m (m = {m1,…, mS}), and the efficiency of each fishing unit is 
drawn from a uniform distribution, ej ~ U[eMIN, eMAX].  In this fishery, the maximum 
achievable profit (MAP) results from allocating all of the fishing effort to the most 
efficient fishing unit. The expected value of the efficiency of the most efficient of J 
fishing units with efficiencies drawn randomly from U[eMIN, eMAX] is given by: 
E max ej{ } j=1
J!
"#
$
%&= eMIN + eMAX − eMIN( )
J
J +1
(
)
*
+
,
-  (B.6), 
which is increasing in the number of fishing units (J), and approaches eMAX as J 
approaches infinity.  Moreover, given an existing set of J fishing units, all from métier m 
with efficiencies {ej}, making an additional fishing unit, k, available to the fishery cannot 
decrease the maximum available efficiency (i.e. the largest ej among all fishing units), 
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and the probability that it will increase the maximum available efficiency will be positive 
(equal to Pr[ek] > max{ej}, which will be 1 – (J/(1+J)) on average if the efficiencies of 
original J units and the additional unit, k, are drawn from the same uniform distribution).  
Thus, the maximum achievable profit (MAP), which is determined by max{ej}, increases 
on average as the diversity of efficiencies increases. The simulation results in Figure 2 
also support this prediction.  
 
Appendix C. Fleet diversity in unmanaged fisheries: Expanded proof of equations 
(6), (7), and (8), and note on the impossibility of priority effects  
 The analysis of fleet diversity in unmanaged fisheries in this study is again based 
on the general model of S stocks and J fishing units initially in the fishery, in which the 
dynamics of each stock, i, are described by equation (2c) and the profits of each fishing 
unit are described by equation (2b): 
dNi t( )
dt = Ni t( ) gi N t( )( )− mijejEj t( )j=1
J
∑( )   (2c), 
π j t( ) = Ej t( ) ej pi Ni t( )( )mijNi t( )i=1
S
∑ −1( )   (2b). 
As stated in the main text, I also assume that the rate of change of fishing effort in fishing 
unit j, dEj(t)/dt, is positive if πj(t) is positive, dEj(t)/dt < 0 if πj(t) < 0, and dEj(t)/dt = 0 if 
πj(t) = 0. At equilibrium (by definition), all dEj(t)/dt = 0 (which implies that all πj(t) = 0) 
and all dNi(t)/dt = 0. This means that equilibrium with a single fishing unit, j, in the 
fishery occurs at a set of abundances, denoted N*j in the main text, at the intersection of 
the vulnerability constraint (the set of abundances where dNi(t)/dt can be equal to 0 for all 
i when only fishing unit j is present in the fishery) and the profitability constraint (the set 
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of abundances where πj(t) = 0) of fishing unit j – a point which was denoted N*j in the 
main text.  It also implies that equilibrium with multiple fishing units occurs at the 
intersection of all profitability constraints of fishing units with positive equilibrium effort 
(Ej* > 0), because πj* = 0 for all fishing units, j, present. 
 
Competition favours efficiency  
If all fishing units have the same métier (i.e. mij = mik for all i, j, k), then the 
fishing unit with the highest efficiency (ej for fishing unit j) will always have the highest 
profits, by equation (2b).  Because dEj(t)/dt > 0 if πj(t) > 0, dEj(t)/dt < 0 if πj(t) < 0, and 
dEj(t)/dt = 0 if πj(t) = 0, as is assumed, the fishing unit with the highest efficiency will 
outcompete all others and be the only one at equilibrium. It will increase in effort until 
stocks are depleted to abundances at which it has zero profits, which would imply 
negative profits, and thus declining effort for all other fishing units.  By the same logic, it 
is impossible for a fishing unit to persist in a fishery in which another fishing unit exists 
with the same métier and a higher efficiency.  
As illustrated in Appendix B above, if the efficiencies of fishing units in a 
particular fishery are drawn randomly from a distribution with a fixed upper bound, 
denoted eMAX, then the expected efficiency of the most efficient fishing unit in the fishery 
increases as the number of fishing units in the fishery increases (e.g. according to 
equation (S.B.6) if the underlying distribution is U[eMIN, eMAX]), and the probability of 
the fishery including a fishing unit with efficiency eMAX approaches 1 as the number of 
fishing units in the fishery approaches infinity. Similarly, if there is a set of possible 
métiers from which métiers of individual fishing units are drawn, the probability of the 
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fishery including a fishing unit with efficiency eMAX and any particular métier also 
approaches 1 as the number of fishing units approaches infinity. Because, no fishing unit 
can persist in a fishery with another with greater efficiency and from the same métier, the 
probability that all stably persisting fishing units have an efficiency of exactly eMAX 
approaches 1 as the number of fishing units initially in the fishery approaches infinity. 
 
Competition promotes balanced exploitation  
 In the main text, it was asserted that, if all métiers are technologically feasible (i.e. 
the métier of each fishing unit in the fishery is drawn randomly from a distribution with 
positive probabilities for all 0 ≤ mij ≤ 1), and efficiencies are drawn from a distribution in 
which the maximum efficiency, eMAX, is the same for all métiers, then any stock, i, extant 
at an equilibrium resulting from infinite initial fleet diversity has an abundance, Ni**eMAX , 
given by equation (7): 
pi Ni**eMAX( )Ni**eMAX = 1eMAX   (7). 
This result follows from two other results. The first of these is the above-demonstrated 
result that, when starting from an infinitely diverse fleet, all extant fishing units at 
equilibrium must have the maximum possible efficiency, eMAX.  The second result is that 
of equation (6), which states that, in a fishery with an initially infinite number of 
randomly selected fishing units, all having the same efficiency, the following relationship 
(equation (6)) must hold for the equilibrium abundances of any two stocks, x and y, 
extant at any resulting equilibrium: 
px Nx*( )Nx* = py Ny*( )Ny*   (6). 
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At any point, N, satisfying equation (6), all possible fishing units with the same 
efficiency (e.g. eMAX) have the same per-unit-effort profits (from equation (2b)),  
π j N( ) = Ej t( ) eMAXpi Ni( )Ni −1"# $%  (C.1), 
where i and j could respectively be any extant stock (by equation (6)) and fishing unit.  
Thus (by equations (5) and (C.1)), the profitability constraints of all possible fishing units 
with efficiency eMAX intersect at the point N**eMAX  described by equation (7); and more 
generally, all possible fishing units having an identical efficiency (regardless of what the 
shared efficiency is) have profitability constraints intersecting at a point satisfying 
equation (6). 
In addition, it is impossible to reach an equilibrium that does not satisfy equation 
(5), starting from an infinite number of fishing units with the same efficiency (e.g. eMAX). 
As demonstrated in the main text, for any equilibrium with any number of fishing units, 
all having identical efficiency, eMAX, that does not satisfy equation (6), there exists at 
least one métier that would have positive profits at that equilibrium, and thus be able to 
invade and disrupt the equilibrium.  The likelihood of this métier being included in the 
fishery would approach 1 as the initial number of fishing units approached infinity.  	    To summarize, with infinite initial fleet diversity in a fishery, only fishing units 
with the maximum possible efficiency (eMAX) can persist, and the only possible 
equilibrium point is N**eMAX from equation (7).  Increasing diversity in efficiency pushes 
the aggregate efficiency of the fishery towards eMAX, and increasing diversity in métiers 
pushes the fishery towards equality in (price x abundance) among extant stocks, 
assuming all métiers are feasible, and eMAX is the same for all métiers.  Equation (8) is 
derived identically to equation (7), but under a relaxation of this latter assumption, 
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whereby there is now an efficiency weight, (ai for stock i) associated with each stock, 
designed to capture stock-specific differences in catchability.  
 
Note: Priority effects on the outcome of competition require different fishing units to face 
oppositely differing  prices for the same catch of at least one pair of stocks  
Priority effects occur when two fishing units compete and neither can invade the 
other’s equilibrium, resulting in an outcome of competition determined by which unit 
enters the fishery earlier or can expand faster.  Priority effects are impossible if all fishers 
face the same prices.  More specifically, for a priority effect to occur between a pair of 
fishing units, j and k, there must be at least one pair of stocks, x and y, for which prices 
received by fishers in units j and k differ oppositely (i.e. pxj > pxk and pyj < pyk, or vice 
versa, where pab denotes the price received for an individual caught of stock a by fishers 
in fishing unit b). This property is illustrated in Figure C1 in a model of a fishery 
targeting two stocks with logistic growth.   
Analogously to priority effects between two ecological consumers (see Tilman 
1980), priority effects between two fishing units result in the existence of an unstable 
equilibrium, where the profitability constraints of both fishing units are satisfied, and 
additional effort in each fishing unit would shift stock abundances away from the 
equilibrium to levels where it made higher profits than the other fishing unit (Figure C1).  
This implies that for priority effects to exist between two competing fishing units, j and k, 
there must be at least one stock, x, for which ejmxj > ekmxk and pxjejmxj < pxkekmxk (i.e. 
more effort in fishing unit j would reduce the abundance of stock x relative to others, 
which would have a greater negative impact on fishing unit k’s revenues than its own), 
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and similarly there must be at least one stock, y, for which ejmyj < ekmyk and pyjejmyj > 
pykekmyk.  This implies that pxj < pxk and pyj > pyk, and therefore x and y must be separate 
stocks.  
 
Appendix D.  Exceptions to common effects of fleet diversification on yield and 
ecological impacts of unmanaged fisheries, as a result of ecology or technological 
feasibility 
 Provided efficiency is finite, infinitely diverse métiers in a multispecies fishery 
drive stocks’ abundances to a point in the first quadrant where they generate equal 
marginal revenue (equation (8)), preventing extinction of weak stocks directly caused by 
the fishery.  This property is illustrated in Figure 4 in a model with no interspecific 
interactions in Figure 4, but also holds under many types of interactions.  For example, 
Figure D1a shows the results of a similar stochastic simulation of a fishery targeting two 
competing stocks, with the same qualitative results as in Figure 4b. The procedure is the 
same as in Figure 4b, except the population growth of both stocks in the absence of 
fishing is described by a simplified Lotka-Volterra competition model (sensu MacArthur 
and Levins 1967), where 
€ 
gi N t( )( ) =1− Ni t( ) − 0.3N j t( ) (i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j), and other 
parameter values/distributions are: {p1 = 1, p2 = 2, m1j ~ U[0, 1], ej ~ U[2, 12]}. As the 
number of fishing units increased, average yields decreased when efficiency varied, and 
increased when only métiers varied.  The average number of extinctions decreased as the 
number of fishing units increased when métiers varied, and increased when only 
efficiency varied (Figure D1a, right panel).  
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 However, some ecosystem structures or restrictions on the range of 
technologically feasible fishing units can cause diversification of métiers to lead to more 
frequent stock collapses.  Ecological specialist stocks that either have obligate prey or 
mutualists also caught or otherwise impacted by the fishery may still be driven extinct.  
Specifically, a stock, i, having long-term persistence that requires an obligate mutualist or 
prey, k, to have at least a minimum population size, Nk,MINi, will be driven extinct at 
infinite fleet diversity if Nk**eMAX < Nk,MINi.  This is illustrated in a stochastic simulation of a 
fishery targeting a predator (Stock 2) and its essential prey (Stock 1) in Figure D1b.  The 
procedure was the same as in Figures 4b and D1a, except that stocks’ population growth 
in the absence of fishing was now described by: 
€ 
g1 N t( )( ) =1− N1 t( ) − N2 t( ), 
g2 N t( )( ) =
N1 t( )− N1,MIN2( )
1− N1,MIN2( )
, and other parameter values/distributions are: {p1 = 1, p2 = 
0.5, m1j ~ U[0, 1], ej ~ U[2, 5]}.  In this model, increases in all types of diversification led 
to increases in average likelihood of predator extinction (Figure D1b).  This occurred 
because competition among diverse métiers and efficiency drives the prey’s abundance to 
a level that is below N1,MIN2 (Figure D1b, left panel).  Additionally, all types of fleet 
diversification increased average yields, as the prey’s average yields increased in 
response to reduced predation pressure, which more than compensated for lost predator 
yields (Figure D1b, right panel).  This latter result is somewhat dependent on parameter 
values, but is likely to hold in systems where transfers of biomass up food chains are 
inefficient, a common property in nature (e.g. Lindeman 1942; Odum 1957; Christensen 
and Pauly 1992).   Thus, diversification of métiers in fisheries impacting multiple trophic 
levels may increase both yields and the likelihood of stock collapses.   
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 Diversification of métiers can also increase the likelihood of stock collapses when 
some relative catch rates are not technologically feasible.  Some relative catch rates may 
not be feasible if, for example, two stocks have sufficiently high niche overlap that it 
would be difficult or impossible to design a fishing technology that catches one without 
also catching the other at a certain rate. If relative catch rates that lead stocks to have 
relative depletions satisfying equation (6) or (8) are not technologically feasible, then it is 
possible for métiers that drive one or more stocks extinct to be favoured by competition.  
Figure D1c illustrates this point in a stochastic simulation identical to Figure D1a, in 
which métiers for which m1j < 0.55 are now technologically infeasible (i.e. m1j ~ U[0.55, 
1]).  As a result, the relationships between diversification in yield seen in Figure D1a are 
similar, but now all types of diversification increase the likelihood of stock 1’s collapse 
(Figure D1c).  An analytical example of this is also given below.  
 Suppose 2 stocks, x and y, having logistic growth (
€ 
gi N t( )( ) = ri 1− Ni t( ) Ki( )( )  for 
all i) where rx = 2ry, Kx = Ky = ax = ay = 1, and px = py = p, are exploited in a fishery, and, 
due to technological constraints, mxj ≤ myj for any fishing unit j.  At any efficiency, pxNx* 
= pyNy* would require either a single fishing unit, j, where mxj = 2myj, or 2 fishing units, j 
and k, where mxj > 2myj and mxk < 2myk, or vice versa.  However, this is infeasible because 
mxj ≤ myj for all j.  Thus, pxNx* > pyNy* at all feasible equilibria, implying that 
competition favours fishing units with the largest possible harvest rate of stock x, which 
in this case corresponds to mx = my (i.e. mx = my = 0.5 because mxj + myj = 1 for all j by 
definition).  Thus, if the maximum efficiency is eMAX, infinite fleet diversity would result 
in equilibrium stock sizes, Nx* = (2/3peMAX) + (1/3), Ny* = (4/3peMAX) – (1/3).  Infinite 
fleet diversity results in the extinction of stock y if eMAX ≥ 4/p.   
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Figure A1. Vulnerability and profitability constraints with different assumptions. 
Vulnerability (a-e) (VC) and profitability constraint (f) (PC) with different ecological and 
economic assumptions.  In each figure, stocks’ zero net growth isoclines (ZNGI) (gi = 0) 
(blue and green lines) and equilibrium abundances (filled circle) in the absence of 
harvesting are shown.  If one of the stocks is not caught in the fishery (qi = 0), increasing 
fishing effort causes equilibrium abundances to move along its ZNGI (gi = 0) towards the 
origin (dashed lines).  If both stocks are caught, increasing fishing effort causes 
equilibrium abundances to move along the vulnerability constraint, which must lie 
somewhere in the gray shaded region, and whose slope is determined by the stocks’ 
relative catch rates and growth rates.  Specific functional forms on which the shapes of 
ZNGIs are based for different classes of species interactions are given in Appendix A. (f) 
When prices increase as stocks’ abundances decrease, the profitability constraint – the set 
of stock abundances that result in zero profits, separating abundances yielding positive 
profits (blue shaded region) and losses (red shaded region) – is generally convex.  
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Figure B1. Diversity of métiers and achievable abundances in managed fisheries. 
The relationship between the number of métiers and the achievability of a multi-stock 
abundance target (NTarget, open circles) is shown in a 3-stock model.  A hypothetical 
vulnerability constraint producing the target is also shown (dashed purple line). With 
only 1 métier (a), achievable outcomes are constrained to a single one-dimensional 
vulnerability constraint curve (red), which is unlikely to coincide exactly with the desired 
curve (purple) in 3-dimensional space by chance.  Similarly, with 2 métiers (b) it is also 
unlikely, though less unlikely, that the 2-dimensional plane of possible achievable 
outcomes (shaded region) contains the desired outcome.  However, with 3 (c) or more 
métiers, the chance that the desired outcome is achievable becomes sizeable, provided the 
3 métiers differ in their relative catch rates. 
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Figure C1. Priority effects require fishing units to face oppositely differing prices 
for pairs of stocks. A 2-stock 2-fishing unit model illustrating the reason for which 
priority effects are only possible if fishers in different fishing units face different prices.   
Slope equations for the vulnerability constraint (Slope(VC)) and profitability constraint 
(Slope(PC)) are derived respectively from equations (4) and (5), assuming there are 2 
stocks, each having logistic growth and constant prices, where abundances (Ni, i = 1,2) 
are normalized as fractions of carrying capacity (i.e. K1 = K2 = 1).  Circles indicate 
equilibrium stock sizes with: only fishing unit 1 (N*1, red), only fishing unit (N*2, blue), 
and the unstable co-existence equilibrium (N*1&2, red and blue). 
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Figure D1. Relationships between fleet diversity and yields and ecological impacts in 
different types of unmanaged fisheries.  These are illustrated in 2-stock fisheries in 
which (a, c) stocks are competing or are (b) predator (Stock 2) and essential prey (Stock 
1).  In panel (c), only métiers j with m1j ≥ 0.55 are technologically feasible, illustrated by 
the grey dashed line in (c) (left).  Points at which p1N1* = p2N2* are illustrated (black solid 
lines), as well as all possible intersection points of vulnerability and profitability 
constraints for fishing units with minimum (eMIN) (grey dotted lines) and maximum 
(eMAX) (black dotted lines) feasible technological efficiency are shown in the left-hand 
panels.  Stocks’ zero net growth isoclines (ZNGI) (gi = 0) (blue and green lines) are also 
shown.  The right-hand panels show the relationships between fleet diversity and yield 
(black) and the average number of extinctions (grey) in stochastic simulations of the 
fisheries illustrated in the corresponding left-hand panels.  Each point represents a sample 
of 1000 models with randomly chosen parameter values.  Vertical lines indicate standard 
errors. 
 
 
